Restless about the gawdawful American electoral system, I have come up with a crackpot proposal for a system for electing a legislature or other body of respresentatives. It seems so simple and elegant to me that I cannot understand why I cannot find anyone else proposing anything like it.
Or debunking its flaws! Knowing the tragic reality that Arrow’s Theorem makes a perfect electoral system impossible, I worry about what gotchas I might have missed. My amateur perusal of the standard ways of analyzing voting methods has not helped — they don’t address the way I handle proportionality, and I cannot work out the math alone. I write this partly in hope that a real expert can set me straight.
The essence
Most systems of proportional representation assume that each seat in the legislature exercises equal strength, so they may give a party a proportion of seats in the legislature corresponding as well as possible to the proportion of voters who cast a ballot for that party, giving a seat to the party’s most popular candidate, second most popular, and so on.
My weighted seats proposal invests different legislative representatives with different strength, proportionate to voters’ support for that rep. Big voter support might give a rep a seat with a strength of 1000, which would outweigh the combined efforts of a pair of less popular reps holding seats with a strength of only 400 each.
To elect a legislature with N seats:
-
Citizens cast ballots listing candidates in rank order of the voter’s preference. A ballot may list as few or as many candidates as the voter wishes.
-
An initial seating tally of the ballots identifies the top N candidates. They get seated as representatives.
-
A second strength tally of the ballots determines the power of each rep’s seat. Each citizen’s ballot delivers the strength of its vote to the seated rep ranked highest on that ballot. Reps’ power in the legislature equals the the votes the rep received in the strength tally.
Example
There are 7 candidates for 5 city council seats:
-
Armstrong
-
Bartlett
-
Cole
-
Davenport
-
Eagle
-
Furlong
-
Gordon
Jane, a voter who liked upstart candidate Furlong, cast this ballot:
-
Furlong
-
Cole
-
Armstrong
Though Jane’s ballot supported Furlong, not enough other voters agreed. Furlong failed the seating tally, which produced a city council comprised of:
-
Armstrong
-
Bartlett
-
Cole
-
Davenport
-
Eagle
In the strength tally, Jane’s ballot contributes its vote to the strength of her second choice, Cole. Tallying all 200k ballots produces these seat strengths:
-
Armstrong — 65k
-
Bartlett — 50k
-
Cole — 45k (including 1 from Jane!)
-
Davenport — 30k
-
Eagle — 10k
This creates a few cases where a minority of strong reps can out-vote a majority of reps who are weak. Armstrong & Cole (65k + 45k = 110k) voting together out-vote Bartlett, Davenport, and Eagle combined (50k + 30k + 10k = 90k).
This should appeal to voters
Intuitive, honest voting
This system produces little need & advantage for voters to vote strategically. They just name the candidates they like, and rank their preferences honestly.
Wide candidate choice
Even when incumbency confers strong advantages, voters may choose from at least as many options as there are seats to fill, so they probably need to make compromises on less positions to pick a candidate to support.
A transparent proportionality mechanism
Unlike in complex proportional systems which cascade ballots’ votes to lower-ranked candidates, voters always have their vote strengthen the successful candidate they liked best.
Practically nobody feels they had a “wasted” vote
If a voter’s ideal candidate wins a seat by a big margin, it was still worth them taking time to vote, because their ballot makes that rep a little bit stronger.
If their ideal candidate does not win a seat, their vote still counts, lending strength to the seated rep whom they ranked highest.
Determining the seating tally
The overview above hand-waves identifying how we determine the candidates seated in Step 2. How should we define the “top” N candidates?
I’m not sure about the ideal method. I suspect that a range of methods would deliver fair and sensible results — and would feel both clear and fair to citizens. And this is the space with an opportunity to “tune” the system to prevent perverse outcomes and get characteristics we prefer — stronger or weaker tendency to support moderation, incumbency, et cetera.
Broad approval?
A simple method would be to tally every candidate appearance on every ballot as a vote for that candidate, much like approval voting. The candidates with the highest N tallies would get seated.
This can theoretically produce odd results. Imagine an election for a 5-seat legislature in which nobody ranked Candidate X in their top 5 … but everyone listed them on their ballot somewhere, so they get a seat. It is wildly improbable, but possible, that this could produce a rep with a seat with zero strength, because every ballot ranked another seated candidate higher.
It does seem likely that this system will produce occasional reps who have a very weak vote because many voters accept them but few prefer them. But a few reps with an equal voice but a weak vote may not be such a bad thing.
Top rank?
Another simple method would be to tally each ballot as a vote just for its top-ranked candidate. The N candidates ranked #1 most often would get seated.
This could get weird in a highly fragmented race. A candidate ranked #2 on every ballot would not get a seat, and it is reasonable to think that they should. Imagine an election for a 5-seat legislature in which 20 candidates are all ranked #1 on 4% of ballots … with 5 candidates ranked #1 on 5% of ballots. Those last 5 candidates would get seated despite not being categorically more popular. But again, these kinds of perverse results seem improbable with real ballots.
A blend?
We could tally a vote for only the three highest ranked candidates on each ballot. Or the four highest, or whatever. A mass of low-ranked support for a candidate could not win them a seat.
We could tallying a vote for every listed candidate, then tally an extra vote for each ballot’s #1 pick, so that between …
-
Armstrong — 100 ballots as #1, 100 ballots ranked lower
-
Bartlett — no ballots as #1, 250 ballots ranked lower
… Armstrong would get a seat with 2x100 + 100 = 300 votes over Bartlett’s 2x0 + 250 = 250 votes.
Something more sophisticated?
A lot of work has been done on various sophisticated positional voting rules which should inform yet more options. Condorcet methods have a lot of advantages, but they present implementation challenges and are complex enough that ordinary voters will find them opaque, so I hesitate to embrace them in this context, since it is not enough for the system to be fair, it also needs to support democratic consent by feeling fair.
Intended advantages
Undercuts gerrymandering & other districting challenges
So long as a district sends multiple reps, voters in the district can expect reasonably fair representation whatever the size & shape of their district, since each voter has their vote contribute equally to the strength of their preferred rep no matter what district they inhabit. Smaller districts produce weaker reps; bigger districts produce stronger reps, but a voter’s ballot delivers the same one-vote power of representation in either case.
Better matching of reps to voter preferences
Rather than having to choose from a few (or in the US, just two) political parties whose platforms may not map well to their preferences, a voter may pick a specific candidate whose program & priorities matches theirs well and expect that candidate to have a shot at a seat in the legislature. In many ways this should work as if there are as many different parties as there are reps in the legislature, which further suggests …
Complex issue-oriented coalitions
Reps would have more opportunities to assemble ad-hoc coalitions around specific issues. A “libertarian” rep might vote together with a “progressive” rep to decriminalize soft recreational drugs, then vote together with a “pro-business” rep to de-regulate an industry.
Less incumbency bias?
This system should do even better than many other ranked-ballot systems like IRV in allowing voters to support challenger candidates without worrying about spoiler effects. Incumbents will still tend to do will if they maintain popular support, and …
Democratic accountability reflected in reps’ shifting strength
Each election will redistribute power. Reps with growing popular support get stronger; reps with waning popular support get weaker. More frequent elections make reps more responsive to popular will; less frequent elections protect reps from popular whims.
Complex unicamiralism
I originally started thinking about this system as a refinement to an old proposal for a nationally-elected Senate in the US. Having opened that door, I realized that this system enables multiple different types of representatives all voting together in a single legislature. For example:
A unicameral US Congress
Choose senators nationally
Why have two geographically-determined sets of national representatives? Choose senators in a national election using this method. Everyone in the country votes, and the top candidates become the Senate.
Having made that change, how about just ten senators? That’s about the maximum number of people who can have an unstructured discussion.
This helps significant but thinly-distributed minorities. If 10% of the American population shares interests but don’t hold a majority in any particular state or district, they could still elect a senator.
Replace the House Of Representatives with county councilors
To address regional interests, instead of tangling with creating fair congressional districts, leverage the somewhat-organic boundaries of counties. Have each county elect five councilors using this method. This eliminates districting fairness problems: though different counties would have different populations, it would be OK because councilors would have different voting strengths in Congress, each voter represented with an equal contribution to their councilor’s power.
With 3000+ counties in the US, that would require over 15,000 councilors! Best to have them cast votes electronically from their home county rather than send them to DC, which would make them more available to constituents.
Different reps vote together
Rather than having the weird two-stage process of current American bicameralism, in this system the two types of reps would vote together, at the same time. The senators would not just get drowned out by the councilors because each senator (representing millions) exercises so much more strength than any councilor (representing thousands). A measure supported by a strong majority of senators could pass if it was a bit short of a majority of councilors, or vice versa.
Assemblors chosen by sortition
Since the system accomodates two types of congressional reps voting together, how about a third?
Add 50 assemblors: citizens randomly chosen by sortition like a jury. Each would vote in congress with the strength of ⅟50th of the voting population. That creates a big enough group to smooth out the bumps of weird individuals, but a small enough group that they could convene in a room together and build real relationships.
A new type of supermajority
Parliamentary systems typically require some kind of supermajority for particularly strong measures. F’rinstance, it currently takes a 2/3 majority in the Senate to ratify a treaty.
Under my proposal, requiring not just a majority vote of the Congress as a whole but a majority among each of the three types of congressional representatives creates another such threshold.
Distinct powers for different classes of representatives
There may be particular functions assigned to one set of Congressional reps or another. Perhaps only senators can introduce new legislation, or judicial appointments are approved by a vote of only the assemblors.
Intra-Congressional checks-and-balances
This structure presents opportunities to make each class of representatives accountable to the other classes.
Perhaps senators do not vote on impeachment proceedings against other senators; instead, impeachment requires a majority of both councilors and assemblors. Likewise impeaching an assemblor would require a majority of senators and councilors. (Since councilors are relatively small fry, they would need a different mechanism for accountability.)
This system also includes an implict check on assemblors. If they do their job well, fewer people might bother to vote for senate, giving assemblors a greater proportion of power in Congress, but if assemblors do badly, it would produce higher election turnout which enables the combined senators & councilors to outweigh the assemblors’ power.
Broader Constitutional implications
A Congress using these elements enable some other changes to constitutional order which I like to daydream about.
A parliamentary executive
Presidential systems have problems; the US got lucky for a long time, but it seems our luck has run out.
My proposal above goes nicely with a prime minister chosen by Congress as chief executive. I think that this kind of Congress picking a PM with ranked ballots would not be vulnerable to the deadlocks which prevent some parliamentary systems from forming a government. With the PM directly answerable to Congress, we might be able to do without Congressional approval of executive appointments.
A president, too?
Unlike countries with constitutional monarchies, in the US the presidency awkwardly combines the chief executive with the ceremonial head of state. Given the poetry of the presidency, it would be nice to keep it to serve as the latter, the kind of job that Ronald Reagan would have been great at and Donald Trump would have been relatively harmless at.
The president would have to be chosen with a national popular vote. For consistency, the presidency could have ranked ballots where voters can list anyone they like, just as they do for senators and councilors, though with a single victor they would have to be evaluated differently; given the much lower stakes, any method would do.
In their ceremonial function, the president would deliver an annual State Of The Union address, award medals, et cetera. I imagine putting the PM in the Old Executive Office Building and leaving the White House for the President. I like the idea of the president also having a discretionary budget of maybe 0.1% of the national budget, plus a bouquet of ombudsman-like powers — the pardon creates a conflict of interest in the hands of a chief executive but might be reasonable for this kind of president, and it might be actually useful if the president could compel Congress to vote on a question.
Stronger counties
Rather than having overlapping jurisdictional relationships between municipalties, counties, states, and the federal government, I imagine vesting power in just counties and the national government, grandfathering in municipal & state entities as elements of or agreements between counties which those counties may alter.
Americans tend to assume that members of the House Of Representatives also have power in their home districts. I propose that councilors would also govern the counties they represent; each local governing council would include those councilors plus local assemblors chosen by sortition who do not vote in the national Congress.
This would enable a distinct form of checks-and-balances if the system were unitary like the UK. The counties hold the powers delegated to them by the national government … but since the councilors also vote in the national Congress, they get a significant say in what those powers are.
Further, frustrated by the current American system which creates dramatic inequities in local resources like schools, I have been imagining that only the national government would be permitted to levy taxes, with each county funded out of the national budget at a rate per resident set in Congress. Since councilors vote in Congress, the national government would not starve the counties of funding, but senators & assemblors considering policy at the national scale would balance the assemblor’s appetite.
With the counties so important, I wonder about making it possible to split, merge, and otherwise re-draw their boundaries. Perhaps councils could propose changes and put them to a plebicite requiring majority approval in each region affected: both counties which want to merge, both regions which would be created with a split, et cetera.
Judiciary?
This system is compatible with any number of approaches to judicial reform I have seen. I have given this aspect much less thought.
Say, f’rinstance, that the Supreme Court works much the way it does now, but instead of our weird system of death and gerentocracy we appoint a new Justice each year and retire the longest-serving justice if that gives the Court more than nine (or however many) Justices. Much like now, the PM might propose appointments subject to approval by Congress … or perhaps that is a job for just the assemblors?
Anti-corruption measures
Any such surgery on the Constitution is a good time to get the money out of politics. There are familiar proposals like public funding of political campaigning. I have a radical proposal of my own.
I propose that any elected official, and perhaps also appointed officials above a certain threshold of authority, become Public Citizens subject to tightly constrained rules for their personal finances. They get a lifetime pension of twice the national median income … but are forbidden to take any other money from anyone. Expensive, and tricky to enforce, but it would make government service a very good deal for an ordinary person and a very bad deal for a rich person, which seems very dramatic to me.
More radical ideas
For now, I have just one more radical proposal:
Candidates for legislative office may pre-commit to specific votes. If legislation they have pre-committed on comes to a vote, they don’t get a choice, they must cast the vote they promised. To avoid shenanigans, this would have to be bound to very specific legislative language.
Related
Another interestingly novel proposal for structuring an elected government.