I've
talked before about how the myth of the Vietnam War colours the way folks talk about the Iraq War. That the stay-the-course talk on the American right reflects their story of Vietnam.
Vietnam was a failure of American will—had we really tried hard enough of course we would have “won.” But the meddling politicians, under pressure from the cowards in the antiwar movement, dishonorably stayed our military's hand.
I see that Digby, reading Bob Woodward's
State of Denial,
takes that reasoning a step further.
Yes, we know it was about oil and it was about Israel and it was about PNAC wet dreams and seven thousand other things. But I'm talking about the Big Reason, the one that united all these people: Iraq is their long awaited chance to do Vietnam right.
Digby's post is long but well worth reading in its entirety, further fleshing out the consequences of the right's mythology of Vietnam, and talking chillingly about some of he White House infighting that got us into Iraq.
There are good points in your article. I would like to supplement them with some information:
ReplyDeleteI am a 2 tour Vietnam Veteran who recently retired after 36 years of working in the Defense Industrial Complex on many of the weapons systems being used by our forces as we speak.
If you are interested in a view of the inside of the Pentagon procurement process from Vietnam to Iraq please check the posting at my blog entitled, “Odyssey of Armements”
http://www.rosecoveredglasses.blogspot.com
The Pentagon is a giant,incredibly complex establishment,budgeted in excess of $500B per year. The Rumsfelds, the Adminisitrations and the Congressmen come and go but the real machinery of policy and procurement keeps grinding away, presenting the politicos who arrive with detail and alternatives slanted to perpetuate itself.
How can any newcomer, be he a President, a Congressman or even the Sec. Def. to be - Mr. Gates- understand such complexity, particulary if heretofore he has not had the clearance to get the full details?
Answer- he can’t. Therefor he accepts the alternatives provided by the career establishment that never goes away and he hopes he makes the right choices. Or he is influenced by a lobbyist or two representing companies in his district or special interest groups.
From a practical standpoint, policy and war decisions are made far below the levels of the talking heads who take the heat or the credit for the results.
This situation is unfortunate but it is ablsolute fact. Take it from one who has been to war and worked in the establishment.
This giant policy making and war machine will eventually come apart and have to be put back together to operate smaller, leaner and on less fuel. But that won’t happen unitil it hits a brick wall at high speed.
We will then have to run a Volkswagon instead of a Caddy and get along somehow. We better start practicing now and get off our high horse. Our golden aura in the world is beginning to dull from arrogance.